{"id":5514,"date":"2026-08-31T15:46:17","date_gmt":"2026-08-31T12:46:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/factcheck.lt\/?p=5514"},"modified":"2026-09-03T00:58:24","modified_gmt":"2026-09-02T21:58:24","slug":"eu_belarusian_media_july2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/factcheck.lt\/eng\/news\/eu_belarusian_media_july2026\/","title":{"rendered":"How Belarusian State Media Talked About Its EU Countries: July 2026","raw":"How Belarusian State Media Talked About Its EU Countries: July 2026"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

4,374 materials \u00b7 14 countries monitored \u00b7 Baltic + Weimar + V4 + Iberia + Benelux<\/p>\n\n\n
\n
4,374<\/div>\n
Total materials<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
\n
1,725<\/div>\n
AI deep-analyzed<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
\n
1341<\/div>\n
Propaganda identified<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
\n
653<\/div>\n
High risk<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
\n
14<\/div>\n
Countries monitored<\/div>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n
\nKey Findings \/ TL;DR<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u2022 Top target by volume<\/strong>: \ud83c\uddeb\ud83c\uddf7 France<\/strong>: 1,394 materials. Followed by: \ud83c\udde9\ud83c\uddea Germany (1,212), \ud83c\uddf5\ud83c\uddf1 Poland (967).<\/p>\n

\u2022 Top narrative<\/strong>: Internal problems: 378 materials in deep analysis (28% of identified propaganda).<\/p>\n

\u2022 Multimodal FIMI on YouTube<\/strong>: Baltic cluster 25.6%<\/strong>, Weimar Triangle 27.7%<\/strong>. Highest country: \ud83c\udde7\ud83c\uddea Belgium (52.9% on 17 videos).<\/p>\n

\u2022 AI<\/strong>: 1,725 materials processed, 653<\/strong> flagged as HIGH risk (37.9%). 1341 identified as propaganda (excluding neutral and not-about-targets).<\/p>\n

\u2022 Coordination<\/strong>: TASS cited in 157<\/strong> materials \u2014 primary amplification pipeline from Russian state media. 93 coordination events detected across 31 days.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Mentions by Country<\/strong><\/p>\n

\ud83c\uddeb\ud83c\uddf7 France<\/strong> leads with 1,394 materials.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
\ud83d\udd36 \ud83c\uddf5\ud83c\uddf1 Poland<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
967<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\ud83d\udd35 \ud83c\uddf1\ud83c\uddf9 Lithuania<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
511<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\ud83d\udd35 \ud83c\uddf1\ud83c\uddfb Latvia<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
685<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\ud83d\udd35 \ud83c\uddea\ud83c\uddea Estonia<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
308<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\ud83d\udd36 \ud83c\udde9\ud83c\uddea Germany<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
1,212<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\ud83d\udd36 \ud83c\uddeb\ud83c\uddf7 France<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
1,394<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\ud83d\udfe2 \ud83c\udde8\ud83c\uddff Czech Republic<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
232<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\ud83d\udfe2 \ud83c\udded\ud83c\uddfa Hungary<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
199<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\ud83d\udfe2 \ud83c\uddf8\ud83c\uddf0 Slovakia<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
65<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\ud83d\udfe0 \ud83c\uddea\ud83c\uddf8 Spain<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
325<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\ud83d\udfe0 \ud83c\uddf5\ud83c\uddf9 Portugal<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
88<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\ud83d\udfe3 \ud83c\uddf3\ud83c\uddf1 Netherlands<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
122<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\ud83d\udfe3 \ud83c\udde7\ud83c\uddea Belgium<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
103<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

Propaganda Narratives<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Country<\/th>\nPropaganda materials<\/th>\nDominant narrative<\/th>\nDistinctive feature<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n
\ud83d\udd36 \ud83c\uddf5\ud83c\uddf1 Poland<\/strong><\/td>\n403<\/td>\nInternal problems (23%)<\/td>\n156 videos<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\ud83d\udd35 \ud83c\uddf1\ud83c\uddf9 Lithuania<\/strong><\/td>\n199<\/td>\nMilitary buildup (33%)<\/td>\nMilitary buildup 33%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\ud83d\udd35 \ud83c\uddf1\ud83c\uddfb Latvia<\/strong><\/td>\n180<\/td>\nMilitary buildup (32%)<\/td>\nMilitary buildup 32%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\ud83d\udd35 \ud83c\uddea\ud83c\uddea Estonia<\/strong><\/td>\n80<\/td>\nMilitary buildup (26%)<\/td>\n43 videos<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\ud83d\udd36 \ud83c\udde9\ud83c\uddea Germany<\/strong><\/td>\n270<\/td>\nMilitary buildup (26%)<\/td>\n181 videos<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\ud83d\udd36 \ud83c\uddeb\ud83c\uddf7 France<\/strong><\/td>\n234<\/td>\nInternal problems (43%)<\/td>\nInternal problems 43%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\ud83d\udfe2 \ud83c\udde8\ud83c\uddff Czech Republic<\/strong><\/td>\n36<\/td>\nArms to Ukraine (33%)<\/td>\nArms to Ukraine 33%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\ud83d\udfe2 \ud83c\udded\ud83c\uddfa Hungary<\/strong><\/td>\n53<\/td>\nInternal problems (37%)<\/td>\nInternal problems 37%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\ud83d\udfe2 \ud83c\uddf8\ud83c\uddf0 Slovakia<\/strong><\/td>\n20<\/td>\nArms to Ukraine (43%)<\/td>\nArms to Ukraine 43%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\ud83d\udfe0 \ud83c\uddea\ud83c\uddf8 Spain<\/strong><\/td>\n96<\/td>\nInternal problems (35%)<\/td>\nInternal problems 35%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\ud83d\udfe0 \ud83c\uddf5\ud83c\uddf9 Portugal<\/strong><\/td>\n16<\/td>\nInternal problems (29%)<\/td>\npropaganda 8.77\/10<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\ud83d\udfe3 \ud83c\uddf3\ud83c\uddf1 Netherlands<\/strong><\/td>\n44<\/td>\nInternal problems (33%)<\/td>\nInternal problems 33%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\ud83d\udfe3 \ud83c\udde7\ud83c\uddea Belgium<\/strong><\/td>\n23<\/td>\nInternal problems (50%)<\/td>\nInternal problems 50%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n
\n\ud83d\udd36 Weimar Triangle: Two Attack Strategies<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Weimar Triangle countries (Poland, Germany, France) receive fundamentally different propaganda treatment than the Baltic states. While the Baltics face a monotonal military threat narrative, each Weimar country is attacked through its unique perceived vulnerability.<\/p>\n\n\n
\n
\ud83d\udd35 Baltic States: military monotone<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Military buildup<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
31%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Internal problems<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
21%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Economic decline<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
11%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Arms to Ukraine<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
8%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Migration<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
7%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n<\/td>\n\n
\ud83d\udd36 Weimar Triangle: diversified attack<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Internal problems<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
28%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Military buildup<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
20%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Arms to Ukraine<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
12%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Economic decline<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
9%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Migration<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
7%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n
\n\ud83d\udfe2 Visegr\u00e1d Group (V4): the Central European frame<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Visegr\u00e1d Four (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia) are framed through a third lens. Here the dominant narrative is EU internal division: Hungary and Slovakia are cast as the “voice of reason” against Brussels. Poland appears in both Weimar and V4 clusters as an analytical lens, not double-counted in totals.<\/p>\n\n\n
\n
\ud83d\udfe2 V4: EU-division dominant<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Internal problems<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
23%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Military buildup<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
19%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Arms to Ukraine<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
16%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Migration<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
10%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Historical revisionism<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
8%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n<\/td>\n\n
\ud83c\uddf5\ud83c\uddf1 Poland: two contexts<\/div>\n

In the Weimar context Poland is attacked as a Western military partner; in the V4 context it appears among Central European neighbours where the EU-division frame dominates. One dataset, two strategic constructions.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n

\n\ud83c\udded\ud83c\uddfa Hungary: a third month without Orb\u00e1n or Magyar<\/strong><\/p>\n

July confirms what May and June recorded: the personalised Hungarian storyline is closed. 199 materials against 218 in May, not a single named figure on thumbnails (Orb\u00e1n 0, Magyar 0), while what remains still runs hot (propaganda 7.98\/10). Hungary is now fully absorbed into the generic anti-EU frame: the month’s leading categories are neighbours’ internal problems and EU internal division, the same lenses applied to the rest of the V4. There is no distinct Hungarian story in July, and that absence is itself the finding.<\/p>\n

\n
May narrative mix<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Internal problems<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
37%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
EU internal division<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
19%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Arms to Ukraine<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
15%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Military buildup<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
12%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Economic decline<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
7%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Western aggression<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
5%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
\n\ud83d\udfe0 Iberia (ES, PT): first month of monitoring<\/strong><\/p>\n

Spain and Portugal enter the monitoring scope with this issue. Volumes are an order of magnitude below the core clusters (325 materials on Spain, 88 on Portugal); the cluster is read mainly through Spain, Portugal appears as background. This is expected for a first month and is stated rather than hidden.<\/p>\n\n\n
\n
\ud83d\udfe0 Iberia: narrative mix<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Internal problems<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
34%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Migration<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
24%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Arms to Ukraine<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
12%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
EU internal division<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
12%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Military buildup<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
9%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n<\/td>\n\n
\ud83c\uddea\ud83c\uddf8 Spain<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Internal problems<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
35%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Migration<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
28%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Arms to Ukraine<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
12%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Military buildup<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
10%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
EU internal division<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
9%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n
\ud83c\uddf5\ud83c\uddf9 Portugal<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Internal problems<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
29%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
EU internal division<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
29%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Nuclear threat<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
18%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Arms to Ukraine<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
12%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Economic decline<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
6%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

Ceuta: the story entered the state agenda two days before the month ended<\/strong><\/p>\n

Spain produced 325 materials in July, and the daily distribution shows exactly how it came into view: 44 materials on 31 July alone, roughly 40 more in the final week, background before that. The trigger was the migration crisis in Ceuta. Belarusian state media picked it up in the last two days of the month with the frame already set: not a humanitarian situation on the border with Morocco but ‘migration chaos’ as a symptom of European weakness. The same stream carried both ‘up to 300 migrants a day’ and ‘49,000 in a day’, two incompatible figures presented as fact; the YouTube version added the old motif of the flow being funded by Soros. This is also where the highest cross-modal divergence of the whole issue sits: 28.2% of Spain-related videos pair an alarmist thumbnail with a low-threat transcript. Portugal (88 materials) stays in the background, mostly neutral news. The full Ceuta analysis, including how the same outlets treated the tunnels under the Latvian and Lithuanian border, follows in the August issue, where the volume exists to support it.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n\ud83d\udfe3 Benelux (NL, BE, LU): first month of monitoring<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg enter the scope with this issue (122, 103 and 13 materials). The cluster is read through the Netherlands; Belgium is background and Luxembourg is kept as a footnote without a country profile. Capitals are deliberately excluded from country matching: in this corpus “Brussels” means the EU and NATO in over 90% of cases and “The Hague” means international courts, not the country.<\/p>\n\n\n
\n
\ud83d\udfe3 Benelux: narrative mix<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Internal problems<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
38%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Arms to Ukraine<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
18%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Military buildup<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
16%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Nuclear threat<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
6%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Economic decline<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
5%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n<\/td>\n\n
\ud83c\uddf3\ud83c\uddf1 Netherlands<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Internal problems<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
33%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Arms to Ukraine<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
25%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Military buildup<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
15%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Migration<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
6%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Nuclear threat<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
6%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n
\ud83c\udde7\ud83c\uddea Belgium<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Internal problems<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
50%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Military buildup<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
15%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Arms to Ukraine<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
8%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Nuclear threat<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
8%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
EU internal division<\/td>\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/td>\n
8%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n

* Luxembourg is counted in the Benelux total but has no country profile: 13 materials this month.<\/p>\n

Benelux in its first month: Belgium as the militarisation exhibit<\/strong><\/p>\n

Of the three countries in the cluster, only Belgium (103 materials) has a story of its own in July: the decision to almost double the armed forces by 2035, from 31,000 to 55,800, and the relaxation of medical requirements for recruits. Belarusian state media relayed it close to the original, with Defence Minister Francken quoted, but placed it alongside Polish and Baltic militarisation: Belgium is not a country in its own right here but one more proof that ‘Europe is preparing for war’. The Netherlands (122) is examined separately below. Luxembourg (13 materials) appears only as a footnote. The cluster’s thumbnail FIMI share (40.9%) is higher than in the core clusters, but it must not be read as heightened attention: the base is 44 video-country pairs, and most of them are omnibus shows on SB TV and Radio-1 where Belgium or the Netherlands are listed alongside five to nine other countries.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n\ud83c\uddf3\ud83c\uddf1 Netherlands spotlight<\/strong><\/p>\n

122 materials, 24 country-mentioning videos, FIMI indicators on 33.3% of thumbnails. July’s main observation: the Netherlands barely appears in Belarusian state media as a country. The leading text-layer category is military threat (62 of 131 mentions), yet inside the materials the Netherlands sits in lists: the ‘coalition of the willing’ arms Ukraine, Europe gives up Russian gas, Europe prepares for war. No distinct Dutch story comparable to the Belgian army or Spanish Ceuta emerged during the month; the one visible entry point is the farmers’ protests, carried in the title of SB TV’s ‘Budni’ talk show on 31 July, and there they illustrate a ‘revolt against the EU’ rather than tell anything about the country.<\/p>\n

The method confirms the picture. The Hague and Rutte are deliberately excluded from the country aliases: in the July corpus 71% of Hague mentions contain no Netherlands at all (they are international courts), and Rutte’s items do not name the country in 89% of cases (he is NATO’s Secretary General). Counting them would nearly double the Dutch volume, but it would be volume about NATO and the ICC. The visual layer agrees with the text: the Netherlands has one of the lowest cross-modal divergence rates in the issue (8.3%), and its leading visual technique is stability framing, a rarity among target countries. For Belarusian state propaganda in July, the Netherlands is not a target but part of the backdrop called ‘Europe’.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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