

Gendered Digital Violence and State Propaganda in Belarus

What 7,814 documents from state, pro-regime and independent media reveal about technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV) as an instrument of repression.


In Belarus, gendered digital violence is not mainly an interpersonal problem. It is state infrastructure.

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Editor-in-Chief & Co-founder, FactCheck.LT · Regional Dialogue on Women in Politics and Gendered Disinformation, 9 September 2026

From 4 million documents to evidence

We did not code topics. We coded the function of every document: does it report the violence, or commit it?



Result: 2,671 TFGBV documents; 868 with explicit gender-based targeting. Inter-model agreement from $\kappa = 0.83$ (victim gender) to $\kappa = 0.36$ (the most interpretive field). Core cases verified by hand.

The one idea to keep. A propaganda post that publishes a woman's fabricated nude images is not "coverage of TFGBV". It is the violence itself. We call such documents perpetration artifacts — and we count who produces them.

Who reports the violence, and who commits it

Of 222 documents that are themselves acts of violence, 220 come from the state and pro-regime segment.

99%

of perpetration artifacts are produced by pro-regime Telegram and state media

42%

of Belarus-related gender-based cases: state actors are the largest perpetrator group — ahead of anonymous criminals (26%) and intimate partners (19%)



Function of the document	Pro-regime Telegram	State media	Independent media
Reports the violence (coverage)	108	313	1,474
Commits the violence (perpetration artifact)	195	25	1
Victim testimony	1	1	60
Crime news / prevention	5	239	68

Among 711 Belarus-related gender-based cases, 87% of victims are women. State perpetrators: security services 189 · pro-regime Telegram 90 · state media 22.

September 2025. Journalist Larysa Shchyrakova reported that after her detention, security officers posted her intimate photos on a dating site. Perpetrator: the state. Form: image-based abuse. Purpose: humiliation of a woman journalist. Standard remedies — report to the platform, go to law enforcement — do not work when law enforcement is the perpetrator.

2,671 documents


One square is one document. The largest form of TFGBV in Belarus is missing from international typologies.



FORESIGHT corpus 2018–2026, ensemble labels. "Repentance videos" = coerced public humiliation; 825 of 850 are Belarus-related.

Anatomy of a coordinated attack: 9–10 April 2025

One target, five channels, seven posts, two days. AI-generated "intimate" images of TV presenter Maryna Mentusova, uploaded to a porn site under her name.




Same infrastructure, next target. 7 August 2025: six channels of the same network synchronously push a "scandal video" against Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the country's most prominent woman politician. The seeding channels are the anonymous "yellow" tier of the state's Telegram pyramid mapped in our earlier research. Gendered attacks are a standing function of existing propaganda infrastructure — production takes minutes; the debunk costs the victim her dignity, permanently.

Lane diagram: each row is an information environment; arrows show where the narrative moves and why. Dates from FORESIGHT corpus timestamps.

Two waves


Perpetration artifacts in the state and pro-regime segment, monthly. The April and August 2025 peaks are entirely gender-based.



Documents that are themselves acts of violence (doxxing, sexualized fakes, mocking of victims), FORESIGHT corpus, ensemble labels.

Who seeds, who amplifies

The same channels appear in every wave. Circle size: TFGBV-related documents per channel.




Circle size = TFGBV-related documents per channel (FORESIGHT retrieval, 7 814 docs). Arrows: retransmission documented in the April and August 2025 waves.

Channel names are proper nouns and do not require translation. Counts from the FORESIGHT retrieval of 7,814 documents.

Whose victimhood counts

The same ecosystem defends men against deepfakes and produces sexualized fakes of women.



Deepfakes of regime officials (fraud, political fakes): 228 male vs 104 female victims. Their cases get coordinated "defense" campaigns — down to district and factory Telegram channels — and even a pro-regime "People's Anti-Fake".

Sexualized fakes: 88% of identified victims are women (23 vs 3). Their cases are produced and amplified by the same ecosystem.

The continuum is the routine. 1,328 documents — half of the corpus — record online-to-offline transitions: doxxing followed by detention, detention followed by a coerced video.

A deepfake of a regime man is an attack. A sexualized fake of a woman activist is content.

Ensemble labels, victim gender field ($\kappa = 0.83$), Belarus-related documents only. "Non-sexualized deepfakes" include fraud and political deepfakes; "sexualized fakes" include AI-generated intimate imagery and fake porn accounts.

WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THE REGION

Belarus is not an outlier. It is a preview.

The most common TFGBV form in our corpus is missing from international typologies: **coerced public "repentance videos" (850 documents)** — offline coercion fused with digital humiliation. In 2026 independent media documented the practice spreading to Azerbaijan.

01

Design for the state as perpetrator

Platform reporting and national law enforcement cannot be the default remedies when the state runs the attack.

02

Document attacks as operations

Seeding dates, channel networks, retransmission chains — to standards usable for future accountability. Our method shows this is feasible on open data.

03

Fast debunk and legal support in EU jurisdictions

Most targets live in the EU. Existing tools — e.g. the EU Neighbours East digital-security toolkit for women's organizations — should be resourced and localized.

Full publication: FactCheck.LT, September 2026 (BY/ EN / LT / RU) — data, method, codebook and inter-model agreement tables. factcheck.lt