How Russia and China Weaponize the Spanish-Speaking World (2022-2025)
With nearly 500 million Spanish speakers and a complex relationship with the United States, Latin America has become a prime target for foreign information operations. This week, we examined five countries — the USA, Brazil, Canada, Venezuela, and Mexico — but the region’s information warfare landscape extends far beyond these cases. Today we survey the broader battlefield.
Russia’s Spanish-Language Empire
While RT and Sputnik face bans across Europe, they continue operating freely in Latin America. According to the U.S. Institute of Peace, RT en Español and Sputnik Mundo reach approximately 32 million regular listeners across a region of 667 million people — and that’s just the overt channels.
RT’s Spanish-language content airs in 18 Latin American countries, including Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Honduras, Venezuela, and Cuba. Only Costa Rica and Uruguay have blocked Russian state media.
The Kremlin’s strategy goes beyond broadcasting. In late 2023 and early 2024, RT launched a street-level promotional campaign in Mexico City, placing posters in Metro and Metrobús stations encouraging commuters to scan QR codes to watch newscasts. President López Obrador publicly opposed restricting RT or Sputnik access for Mexican audiences.
Content Laundering Through Local Journalists
The U.S. State Department’s Global Engagement Center revealed in November 2023 that Russia “is currently financing an ongoing, well-funded disinformation campaign across Latin America” spanning at least 13 countries.
The operation works through “content laundering“: A team in Russia creates content and sends it to an editorial staff in Latin America — likely in Chile — for review, editing, and publication in local media. This makes Russian propaganda appear organic to local audiences.
As James Rubin, the State Department’s Global Engagement Center coordinator, explained to VOA: “They’re trying to create content in Russia and launder it through Latin American journalists. They are covertly co-opting local media and influencers to spread disinformation and propaganda.”
Russian ambassadors also play a role. According to the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab, ambassadors in countries like Colombia have placed op-eds in major newspapers (including El Tiempo, Colombia’s most influential paper) pushing Kremlin narratives about Ukraine and sanctions.
China’s Quiet Expansion
While Russia’s operations are relatively overt, China takes a longer-term approach focused on building positive narratives rather than sowing chaos.
According to TIME Magazine, the Nisos cybersecurity firm identified a network of pro-Beijing “sock puppet” accounts targeting Latin American audiences on social media. These accounts, linked to China News Service, post content “designed to bolster the country’s status as a top regional ally and trading partner.”
The Paperwall campaign, exposed by Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto, revealed a covert digital influence operation spanning more than 30 nations in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. A network of at least 123 websites mimics local newspapers to promote pro-Beijing narratives.
Beijing also uses its “borrow a boat to go out to sea” strategy — disseminating government content through foreign media partnerships. In November 2024, two Peruvian media outlets, América TV and daily El Comercio, signed cooperation agreements with China Media Group. The People’s Daily has partnerships with newspapers in Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil.
Spamouflage and AI Disinformation
China’s Spamouflage campaign, identified by Graphika in 2019, has become more aggressive in recent years. Using artificial intelligence tools to create videos of non-existent characters and fake personas, the campaign aims to manipulate public opinion and undermine trust in institutions.
According to the Oxford Internet Institute, 26,879 Twitter accounts amplifying posts by Chinese diplomats or state media were suspended for violating rules against manipulation. Google removed 10,570 YouTube channels engaged in coordinated influence operations linked to China between January and September 2021 alone.
Venezuela’s Telesur: Regional Amplifier
Venezuela’s state-owned Telesur functions as a regional counterpart to RT, broadcasting content that casts a positive light on Russia and a negative one on the West. The network serves as a force multiplier for Russian and Chinese narratives throughout Spanish-speaking Latin America.
Elections Under Siege: Common Patterns
A comprehensive study by Chequeado analyzing 2023-2024 elections across seven Latin American countries identified recurring disinformation patterns:
1. Fraud Narratives: In nearly every election, small irregularities — a malfunctioning voting machine, a smudge on an official document — were presented as evidence of massive fraud. This pattern appeared in Argentina, Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico, Guatemala, and Paraguay.
2. Fake Celebrity Endorsements: A new trend emerged with false claims of famous figures supporting candidates. In Argentina, footballer Lionel Messi was falsely shown supporting both presidential finalists — Milei and Massa — through manipulated posts and images.
3. AI-Generated Content: Deepfake videos targeted candidates across the region. In Mexico, a deepfake of Claudia Sheinbaum promoting a fraudulent investment scheme went viral. Similar manipulated content appeared in Venezuela, Argentina, and Panama.
4. Fake Polls: Fabricated survey results spread using the logos and branding of legitimate polling organizations, observed in Mexico, Guatemala, and Argentina.
Case Studies Beyond This Week
Chile 2022: A viral lie claiming Chile’s progressive draft constitution would end private homeownership spread through a website registered by Argentine marketer Fernando Cerimedo. Analysts believe the flood of fake news contributed to the constitution’s rejection in the referendum.
Colombia 2021: Russian agent Sergei Vagin was captured after allegedly financing violent actions during protests, according to Colombian intelligence. The incident demonstrates how Russia exploits social unrest.
Argentina 2023: Beyond the Messi deepfakes, false statements attributed to candidates Victoria Villarruel and Sergio Massa circulated widely, along with manipulated poll results bearing fake organization logos.
Hired Disinformation: Digital Mercenaries
The Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism (CLIP) revealed a network of “digital mercenaries” — marketing groups creating fake news sites and troll farms for political clients across ideological lines.
One operator, César Hernández Paredes, created mock news sites and fake social media accounts for clients including Mexico’s ruling Morena party, former Bolivian President Evo Morales, former Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa, and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Similar operations serve right-wing clients elsewhere.
Responses and Resistance
Some countries are fighting back:
Brazil has taken the most aggressive stance, with electoral authorities actively pursuing disinformation spreaders and the Superior Electoral Court issuing specific AI regulations.
Uruguay set an example in 2019 when political parties signed an ethics pact pledging not to generate or promote disinformation against adversaries.
Panama’s electoral institution has engaged in joint workshops with Argentina and Costa Rica to share best practices on monitoring social media operations.
Finland’s example — launching robust anti-fake news education in schools in 2014 — has been cited as a model for Latin American countries to build societal resilience.
The Strategic Picture
The Brookings Institution notes that Russia and China apply their influence toolkits differently in Latin America:
Russia — a declining power — seeks to disrupt partnerships and institutions, seeing Latin America as a counterpoint to U.S. policy in Europe. Moscow is not particularly sensitive to attribution for its coercive activities.
China — a rising power — seeks to build a new order more conducive to its interests. It uses carrots rather than sticks, with information operations primarily aimed at building a positive view of China rather than sowing chaos.
Both benefit from the region’s “multipolarity” narrative — the idea that the U.S. is a declining power while alternatives emerge. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov’s framing of Western behavior as “neo-colonialism” resonates in a region with centuries of colonial history.
The Lesson
Latin America represents a critical testing ground for information warfare techniques. The region’s characteristics — widespread Spanish-language social media, distrust of traditional institutions, proximity to the United States, and historical grievances against Western powers — make it fertile ground for both Russian disruption and Chinese influence-building.
The patterns emerging here — content laundering through local journalists, AI-generated deepfakes, cross-border troll farms, and exploitation of electoral moments — are being refined for deployment worldwide. As one U.S. official told VOA: Latin America is where authoritarians test their playbooks before scaling them globally.
Sources:
- VOA. Kremlin Propaganda on Uptick in Latin America. December 2023.
- Atlantic Council DFRLab. Russia’s ambassadors and state media in Latin America. February 2024.
- TIME. China’s Online Influence Campaign in Latin America. July 2023.
- Brookings. Countering China and Russia’s asymmetric activity in Latin America. July 2023.
- Chequeado. Desinformación electoral en América Latina. December 2024.
- Diálogo Américas. Russian Disinformation Advances in Latin America. February 2024.
- Diálogo Américas. China’s Influence Operations in Latin American Media. 2025.
- Factchequeado. Russian Propaganda in Latin America. November 2024.
- Foreign Policy. Inside Latin America’s Fake News Problem. August 2023.
