In recent years, neighboring EU countries Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia have regularly appeared in Belarusian state media stories. The publication answers the questions: how often, in what contexts, and with what evaluative framework are these countries depicted on YouTube channels of Belarusian state media. We also highlight verifiable statements that require a separate fact check.
Methodology
The analysis was conducted based on metadata and fragments of YouTube videos of Belarusian state media. The methods of automatic tonality analysis, thematic frame extraction and temporal analysis were used. The analysis of disinformation narratives was conducted and hypotheses for future classical fact-checking publications were prepared.
Where LLM capabilities were used:
transcribing video into text;
to assess disinformation risks;
fact-checking.
For each country, summary charts and representative quotes have been prepared.
General overview
Analysis period: 01.07.2025 – 31.07.2025
Poland Video:167 |Views:13,073,457 |Engagement:2.58% Top channels:CTVBY, SBTV, ONT TV Channel
Lithuania Video:125 |Views:7,593,840 |Engagement:2.76% Top channels:CTVBY, ONT TV Channel, SBTV
Latvia Video:53 |Views:1,234,917 |Engagement:3.42% Top channels:SBTV, NEWS.BY: news of Belarus and the world, CTVBY
Dynamics of mentions by week
Temporary peaks may correlate with specific events or information campaigns. Synchronicity of changes across countries suggests a coordinated approach.
Distribution by channels and countries
LLM Analysis of Disinformation
AI Analysis SummaryAnalyzed238video using gpt-4o-mini
Detected52videos with a high risk of misinformation (21.8% of those analyzed)
AI Analysis Results
Basic techniques:
Emotional manipulation (dominant)
False facts
Dehumanization
Conspiracy theories
21.8% – a significant share of potentially problematic content. The prevalence of emotional manipulation is typical for propaganda narratives.
Systematization of controversial statements creates a basis for further verification and counteraction of disinformation.
Revealed20statements requiring priority verification
Recommendations
It is critical for the research community and fact-checking organizations to continue systematically monitoring the identified channels and develop more sophisticated automated systems for detecting disinformation. Creating a database of verified claims will improve the efficiency of refuting false information and prevent its re-dissemination. Particular attention should be paid to the development of a methodology for analyzing coordinated inauthentic behavior in the information space.
Platforms and regulators need to reconsider approaches to monitoring channels with a high concentration of problematic content. The introduction of warning systems for potentially unreliable information should be combined with increased requirements for transparency in media channel funding. It is especially important to develop mechanisms for rapid response to coordinated disinformation campaigns.
Civil society should focus on developing media literacy among the population as a long-term strategy for countering manipulative technologies. The creation of alternative sources of information and support for independent journalism are becoming critical to ensuring information pluralism. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account that the effectiveness of such measures depends on their systematic nature and coordination between various public organizations. In the context of regional security, this study highlights the need to develop international cooperation in the field of countering cross-border disinformation. Coordination of efforts between neighboring countries can significantly increase the effectiveness of protecting the information space from manipulative influence. This is especially relevant in the context of hybrid threats, when information influence becomes an integral part of broader geopolitical strategies.
Conclusions
The conducted analysis demonstrates the presence of a systemic information strategy of the Belarusian state media in relation to neighboring EU countries. These are not random mentions in the news agenda, but coordinated efforts to form a certain image of Poland, Lithuania and Latvia in the public consciousness. Particularly indicative is the synchronicity of changes in the intensity of coverage of all three countries, which indicates a single center for planning information campaigns.
An alarming signal is the high proportion of materials with signs of disinformation. Every fifth analyzed video contains a high risk of unreliable or manipulative information, which significantly exceeds the indicators acceptable for high-quality journalism. At the same time, the main emphasis is on emotional manipulation, which is typical of propaganda technologies aimed at forming emotional, rather than rational assessments of the audience.
The concentration of problematic content on a limited number of channels, especially CTVBY, indicates a specialized division of roles in the information ecosystem. This suggests the presence of a clear hierarchy and coordination between various media resources within the framework of a single strategy.
Thematic analysis of high-risk materials reveals the dominance of narratives about “external threats”, “extremism” and “hostile activity” of neighboring countries. This approach is classically used to mobilize public opinion and create an image of a besieged fortress, which serves as an instrument of domestic political consolidation.
