How Belarusian state media talked about its EU neighbours — September 2025

Key findings of the study / TL;DR
September 2025 became one of the most tense months in the information war: the incident with Russian drones in Poland and Belarus on the eve of the Zapad-2025 military exercises provoked a sharp surge in anti-Polish propaganda in Belarusian state media.

Key figures:
497 videos (30% of all content) are dedicated to three neighboring EU countries.
Poland dominates with 56.3% of mentions and 54 million views.
Every fifth video (21.5%) contains a high risk of disinformation.
Poland is the main target: average risk of disinformation 4.5/10 (the highest).

The main weapons of state propaganda: emotional manipulation, false facts, and dehumanization of the populations of neighboring countries.

Methodology

The analysis was conducted using metadata and YouTube video fragments from Belarusian state media. Methods of automatic sentiment analysis, thematic frame detection, and temporal analysis were used. Disinformation narratives were analyzed and hypotheses for future classic fact-checking publications were developed.
Where LLM capabilities were used:

• video transcription into text;
• to assess disinformation risks;
• fact-checking.

Summary charts and representative quotes have been prepared for each country.

General overview
Analysis period: September 1, 2025 – September 30, 2025

Dynamics of mentions by week

The information campaign against Poland was targeted and coordinated. The sharp increase in mentions from the beginning of the month (from ~35 to 90+ videos in the third week) correlates with military and political events. After reaching its peak, the intensity decreased tenfold (to ~8 videos in the fourth week), indicating the reactive nature of the propaganda—a reaction to specific events rather than a consistent strategy. Lithuania and Latvia remained secondary targets with relatively stable, low levels of mentions.

Distribution by channels and countries

Anti-European propaganda is concentrated in the hands of a small circle of state media. The top three channels (CTVBY, SBTV, and ONT TV Channel) produce the overwhelming majority of content. This demonstrates centralized control of the information agenda and coordination among state media. The distribution of activity reveals a clear hierarchy: the leading channels shape narratives, while the others broadcast them.

Poland is the absolute priority of Belarusian state propaganda (56.3% of all mentions), which is explained by its role as the largest neighbor in the EU and a key ally of Ukraine. Lithuania (38.4%) is the second most important target, due to its active support of the Belarusian opposition. Latvia (5.2%) remains on the periphery of the information war, mentioned primarily in the context of general anti-Baltic narratives. This distribution reflects the regime’s pragmatic approach: attacking first the countries with the greatest geopolitical influence in the region.

Propaganda content production follows a standard work schedule, with peaks on Wednesday-Thursday (~100 videos) and activity declining on weekends (~48-50 videos). This confirms the industrial nature of the disinformation machine: content is created by professional teams during the workweek. Relatively high activity, even on weekends, indicates the continuity of the information campaign and a readiness to respond quickly to events.

LLM analysis of disinformation
Analyzed497Video using gpt-4o-mini
Detected107Videos with a high risk of misinformation (21.5% of those analyzed).

AI analysis results

Basic techniques:

• Emotional manipulation (dominant)
• False facts
• Dehumanization
• Conspiracy theories

SBTV and BelTA are leaders in the use of manipulative techniques, particularly false facts (4.3-4.6) and emotional manipulation (3.7-4.3). All analyzed channels employ the full range of disinformation techniques, but with varying intensity. ONT demonstrates a “softer” approach (1.1-1.9), perhaps seeking to maintain the image of a more “objective” source. Conspiracy theories are used moderately (0.4-2.2), which may indicate a desire to maintain the appearance of content legitimacy.

Belarusian state media employ a hybrid disinformation strategy: a third of the content (38.8%) remains relatively neutral (low risk), creating a façade of objectivity. However, more than 60% of materials carry a medium or high risk of manipulation, with one in five videos (22.6%) being outright propaganda. This distribution allows state media to balance maintaining audiences and fulfilling the regime’s ideological goals.

Poland is the main target of aggressive disinformation (risk ~4.5/10), significantly higher than Lithuania and Latvia (~3.1-3.2). This confirms the hierarchy of enemies in Belarusian state propaganda: Poland is perceived as the most dangerous adversary, requiring intensive information processing. The relatively low gap between the Baltic states indicates that they are viewed within the context of a single “hostile Baltic,” without significant differentiation in approaches.

All leading channels demonstrate a comparable average risk (4-5/10), indicating a unified editorial policy and coordination among state media. The lack of significant differences between the channels confirms the centralized control of the information agenda by the authorities. Even channels with a reputation for “more objective” (such as ONT TV Channel) do not deviate from the general picture, demonstrating total control over the media space.

AI analysis revealed that 21.5% of content contains signs of disinformation. Emotional manipulation (prevalent in all materials), false facts, and dehumanization are prevalent. Conspiracy theories are used less frequently, which may indicate an attempt to make the materials appear factual.

Top High-Risk Videos

Name	Channel	Country	General risk	False facts	Emotional manipulation	Priority
The Baltics are sold! Land and people have become hostages.	SBTV	Lithuania	9.0	8.0	9.0	high
Children were beaten for speaking Belarusian! | Polish con…	CTVBY	Poland	9.0	8.0	9.0	high
Refugees in Europe are fleecing the disabled blind! #Eur…	CTVBY	Poland	9.0	8.0	9.0	high
🔴Poland’s lies and provocations! How NATO’s air defense system was disgraced…	SBTV	Lithuania	8.0	8.0	7.0	high
A dead refugee at the Lithuanian border! #politics #refugees…	CTVBY	Lithuania	8.0	8.0	7.0	high
What idiots! Who dreams of a truly terrifying Lithuanian…	SBTV	Lithuania	8.0	0.0	8.0	high
“They only understand a club!” // Who needs Belarus in…	News agency	Lithuania	8.0	0.0	8.0	high
The name “Belaya Rus” wasn’t imposed! #belarus…	CTVBY	Lithuania	8.0	8.0	6.0	high
IT WILL HAPPEN TO YOU! What crazy things will they drive their people to…	SBTV	Lithuania	8.0	8.0	7.0	high
They’re bringing in drugs and explosives. The West is waging a hybrid…	SBTV	Lithuania	8.0	8.0	7.0	high

Bank of statements for fact-checking
Systematization of controversial claims creates a basis for further verification and countering disinformation.
Revealed20statements requiring priority review

No.	Video title	Statement	Channel	Country	Risk	Priority	Status
1	The Baltics are sold! Land and love…	The Baltics are sold	SBTV	Lithuania	9.0	high	requires verification
2	The Baltics are sold! Land and love…	The earth and people became hostages	SBTV	Lithuania	9.0	high	requires verification
3	Children were beaten for speaking Belarusian…	Poland oppressed Belarus	CTVBY	Poland	9.0	high	requires verification
4	Children were beaten for speaking Belarusian…	Children were beaten for speaking Belarusian.	CTVBY	Poland	9.0	high	requires verification
5	Children were beaten for speaking Belarusian…	Polish concentration camps	CTVBY	Poland	9.0	high	requires verification
6	Refugees in Europe are fleecing disabled people…	refugees fleece disabled people	CTVBY	Poland	9.0	high	requires verification
7	Refugees in Europe are fleecing disabled people…	refugees receive benefits	CTVBY	Poland	9.0	high	requires verification
8	🔴Poland’s lies and provocations! How…	Lies and provocations of Poland	SBTV	Lithuania	8.0	high	requires verification
9	🔴Poland’s lies and provocations! How…	How NATO’s air defense system was disgraced	SBTV	Lithuania	8.0	high	requires verification
10	🔴Poland’s lies and provocations! How…	Trump associate killed	SBTV	Lithuania	8.0	high	requires verification
11	🔴Poland’s lies and provocations! How…	Europe is plunging into hell	SBTV	Lithuania	8.0	high	requires verification
12	A dead refugee near the Lithuanian border…	A dead refugee was found near the Lithuanian border.	CTVBY	Lithuania	8.0	high	requires verification
13	What idiots! Who dreams of scary…	the terrible Lithuanian reality	SBTV	Lithuania	8.0	high	requires verification
14	“They only understand a club!” // K…	Lithuania is a Soviet city	BelTA News Agency	Lithuania	8.0	high	requires verification
15	“They only understand a club!” // K…	They only understand a club	BelTA News Agency	Lithuania	8.0	high	requires verification
16	“They only understand a club!” // K…	Who needs Belarus on fire?	BelTA News Agency	Lithuania	8.0	high	requires verification
17	“They only understand a club!” // K…	Why there should be MORE exercises	BelTA News Agency	Lithuania	8.0	high	requires verification
18	The name “White Rus'” was not…	seizure of the name Lithuania	CTVBY	Lithuania	8.0	high	requires verification
19	The name “White Rus'” was not…	imposition of the name ‘White Rus”	CTVBY	Lithuania	8.0	high	requires verification
20	IT’S GOING TO HAPPEN TO YOU! What has…	The authorities of Poland and Lithuania are driving their people to extremes	SBTV	Lithuania	8.0	high	requires verification

Videos with the highest risk for Belarus’s neighbors

Lithuania – Top Episodes

We show up to 15 entries with the highest risk.

Latvia – Top Episodes

We show up to 15 entries with the highest risk.

Poland – Top Episodes

We show up to 15 entries with the highest risk.

General conclusion

An analysis of the content of Belarusian state media in September 2025 revealsa well-oiled information war machine, operating on clear principles:

Strategy:

1. Reactivity and pragmatism: the intensity of the campaigns directly correlates with geopolitical events (drone incident → surge in anti-Polish content)
2. Prioritizing goals: Poland, as the main threat to the regime, receives maximum attention (56% of content), Lithuania is secondary (38%), Latvia is marginal (5%)
3. Hybrid approach: a combination of relatively neutral content (39%) with outright propaganda (23%) to maintain the appearance of objectivity

Tactics:

1. Industrial production: stable daily content production (~70-100 videos/day) by professional teams
2. Centralized coordination: The top 3 channels control the agenda using identical disinformation techniques
3. Arsenal of manipulation: a predominance of emotional manipulation and false facts with a moderate use of conspiracy theories (to maintain the audience’s trust)

Efficiency:

• Mass coverage: 71 million views per month (average 2.4 million/day)
• High involvement: 2.4-2.6% engagement rate for all countries
• Critical mass of disinformation: Every fifth video carries a high risk of manipulation

Main risks:

1. Systematic dehumanizationpopulations of neighboring EU countries creates a long-term basis for escalating hostility
2. Normalization of disinformationThe constant presence of manipulative content reduces critical perception of information among the audience.
3. Coordination with Russian propaganda: Events surrounding the Zapad-2025 exercises are being used to synchronize information attacks

Result: Belarusian state media function asintegrated hybrid warfare tool, where information aggression against neighboring EU countries is not a side effect, buttargeted state policyThe high level of professionalism, centralized coordination, and adaptability of the strategy make this system a serious threat to the region’s information security.