On September 28, 2025, Moldova held what President Maia Sandu called “the most consequential election in the history of the country.” The parliamentary vote would determine whether Europe’s poorest nation continued toward EU membership or drifted back into Moscow’s orbit.
Russia deployed every tool in its hybrid warfare arsenal to influence the outcome. It failed.
The stakes
Moldova, a country of 2.5 million wedged between Romania and Ukraine, had been on an accelerating path toward Europe. In October 2024, a referendum enshrining EU membership in the constitution passed narrowly — just 50.46% in favor. The following month, Sandu won re-election with 55.4%. But both victories came despite massive Russian interference, including a vote-buying scheme that transferred tens of millions of dollars to over 138,000 Moldovans — roughly 10% of the active electorate.
The parliamentary election would complete the trilogy. If PAS (Party of Action and Solidarity) held its majority, Moldova’s European trajectory was secure. If pro-Russian forces gained ground, the path to Brussels would become far more uncertain.
The interference campaign
Russian operations targeting the election were multi-dimensional:
Financial warfare: The Kremlin spent “hundreds of millions of euros” according to Sandu, channeling money through Russian bank Promsvyazbank to buy votes. Fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, operating from Moscow, coordinated much of the scheme. His network had already corrupted the 2024 referendum results.
Energy blackmail: In January 2025, Russia halted natural gas supplies to Transnistria, Moldova’s Russian-backed breakaway region. The resulting energy crisis was designed to punish Moldovans for their European choice and demonstrate the costs of defying Moscow.
Cyberattacks: Over 1,000 attacks targeted critical government infrastructure in the months before the election, including electoral systems on voting day itself.
Planned violence: Moldovan police arrested three individuals allegedly from Transnistrian security services who were planning “mass destabilizations and disorder.” Officers found pyrotechnics and flammable materials intended to cause panic.
Disinformation at scale: A BBC investigation uncovered networks paying participants to post pro-Russian propaganda. Hundreds of fake accounts spread disinformation on TikTok and Facebook. Ziarul de Gardă found many supported Victoria Furtună’s Greater Moldova Party, which was ultimately barred from the election for voter bribery and illegal Russian financing.
Election day sabotage: Bomb threats targeted polling stations in Brussels, Rome, Genoa, Bucharest, Alicante, and even Asheville, North Carolina. Bridges connecting Transnistria to Moldova were closed amid reports they had been mined — preventing many residents from voting.
The result
Despite everything, PAS won decisively: 50.2% of the vote and 55 of 101 parliamentary seats. The pro-Russian Patriotic Electoral Bloc, led by former president Igor Dodon, finished distant second with 24.2% and 26 seats.
Turnout reached 52.21% — the highest for parliamentary elections since 2014. The diaspora proved crucial: 281,170 Moldovans voted from abroad, predominantly in Italy, Germany, Romania, and France.
Dodon immediately claimed victory and called for protests. Around 100 people showed up — mostly elderly. Russian state media prepared “alternative narratives” within an hour of results, alleging fraud. The protests, described by the German Marshall Fund as “modest” and “tightly policed,” failed to generate momentum.
What made Moldova resilient
Moldova’s success wasn’t accidental. Several factors contributed:
Institutional preparation: Authorities conducted hundreds of raids before the election, detaining those planning violence. The Greater Moldova Party was disqualified for proven Russian financing.
Vote-buying countermeasures: Sandu noted that measures to discourage vote-buying “worked” — far fewer votes were purchased compared to the 2024 referendum.
Civil society vigilance: Organizations like Promo-LEX monitored violations in real-time and reported irregularities to the Central Electoral Commission.
EU support: Since 2021, the EU has mobilized over €2.2 billion in grants and loans to support Moldovan sovereignty, with an additional €1.9 billion Reform and Growth Facility approved for 2025-2027.
Diaspora mobilization: Moldovans abroad voted overwhelmingly for Europe, providing a decisive margin that domestic interference couldn’t overcome.
Lessons from Moldova
- Money alone can’t buy elections — Russia spent massively but couldn’t overcome determined voters and prepared institutions.
- Energy blackmail has limits — The gas cutoff hurt Moldovans but also clarified the stakes of dependency on Russia.
- Preparation matters — Pre-election raids, party disqualifications, and anti-corruption measures reduced interference effectiveness.
- Diaspora votes count — Overseas Moldovans provided a crucial buffer against domestic manipulation.
- The threat persists — Shor remains active from Moscow. Transnistria remains a lever. Disinformation networks will adapt. Moldova won a battle, not the war.
Our research
FactCheck.LT conducted extensive monitoring of information operations targeting Moldova’s parliamentary election.
Our investigation “Belarus as a Launchpad” documented how TikTok accounts registered in Belarus were used to deliver Russian propaganda to Moldovan audiences. Analyzing content with Cyrillic hashtags #молдова and #кишинев from July 10 to September 8, 2025, we identified 337 videos from 36 unique channels that accumulated 28.7 million views. The top channel alone (@maxim0440.3) generated 21.8 million views across 140 videos. Crucially, audience analysis revealed that up to 46% of viewers were in Moldova — despite content being uploaded from Belarus. This represents a systematic use of Belarusian accounts as “safe” proxies to circumvent TikTok restrictions on Russian users while targeting Moldovan voters with clips from Russian state television. Full analysis: Belarus as a launchpad: TikTok videos promote Kremlin narratives in Moldova.
We also documented a three-phase disinformation scheme by Belarusian state media covering the election. Analyzing content from CTVBY, NEWS.BY, BelTA, SBT, and ONT from September 23-30, 2025, we found that 93.8% of materials fell into the high-risk disinformation category, with 0% classified as low-risk. The campaign evolved systematically: Phase 1 (pre-election) established narratives of “repression” and “external control”; Phase 2 (election day) pushed real-time “fraud” allegations including claims that authorities were “burning opposition ballots”; Phase 3 (post-results) framed the outcome as illegitimate and Moldova as “controlled from outside.” This prolonged strategy creates persistent perception of elections as unfair, requiring comprehensive countermeasures. Full report: Scandal on schedule: Three-phase disinformation scheme on Moldova’s parliamentary elections.
Sources:
- 2025 Moldovan parliamentary election — Wikipedia
- Moldova’s pro-EU party wins clear parliamentary majority — NPR, September 29, 2025
- Moldova’s ruling pro-EU party wins election — CNN, September 29, 2025
- In Moldova’s election, the line held — CEPS, October 2025
- Moldova election results — Al Jazeera, September 29, 2025
- Moldova’s Election: A Victory Brings Dual Challenge — Egmont Institute, October 2025
