First month with France added to monitoring scope. Baltic states vs. Weimar Triangle: two propaganda strategies revealed.
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6,891
Total materials
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1,189
AI deep-analyzed
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681
Propaganda identified
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284
High risk
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6
Countries monitored
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Key Findings / TL;DR
• France was added to the monitoring scope for the first time. It immediately became the most-mentioned country (4,396 materials) with a unique propaganda profile: internal problems (31%) lead over military buildup (26%), and nuclear threat (15%) is an exclusive narrative absent from Baltic coverage.
• Two propaganda strategies revealed: Baltic states face monotonal military threat narrative (43–47%), while Weimar Triangle countries (Poland, Germany, France) receive diversified attacks through each country’s perceived vulnerabilities.
• Estonia anomaly: 94.8% FIMI rate on YouTube — nearly every video mentioning Estonia contains foreign information manipulation indicators.
• Nuclear narrative surge: 46 materials classified as nuclear threat, driven by Macron’s nuclear deterrence speech and plans to potentially transfer weapons to Ukraine.
• Coordination: TASS cited in 198 materials — primary amplification pipeline from Russian state media.
Mentions by Country
France, monitored for the first time, immediately surpassed all other countries by volume.
| 🔶 🇵🇱 Poland | 2,762 | |
| 🔵 🇱🇹 Lithuania | 1,954 | |
| 🔵 🇱🇻 Latvia | 1,908 | |
| 🔵 🇪🇪 Estonia | 342 | |
| 🔶 🇩🇪 Germany | 2,963 | |
| 🔶 🇫🇷 France | 4,396 |
Propaganda Narratives
| Country | Propaganda materials | Dominant narrative | Distinctive feature |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🔶 🇵🇱 Poland | 250 | Military buildup (40%) | Most diversified attack |
| 🔵 🇱🇹 Lithuania | 202 | Military buildup (42%) | Highest avg threat (Baltic) |
| 🔵 🇱🇻 Latvia | 130 | Military buildup (47%) | Military dominance (47%) |
| 🔵 🇪🇪 Estonia | 68 | Military buildup (38%) | Highest FIMI (94.8%) |
| 🔶 🇩🇪 Germany | 237 | Military buildup (37%) | Economic decline rivals military |
| 🔶 🇫🇷 France | 236 | Internal problems (31%) | Nuclear 15%, internal problems lead |
🔶 Weimar Triangle: Two Attack Strategies
The Weimar Triangle countries (Poland, Germany, France) receive fundamentally different propaganda treatment than the Baltic states. While the Baltics face a monotonal military threat narrative (43–47%), each Weimar country is attacked through its unique perceived vulnerability.
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🔵 Baltic States: military monotone
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🔶 Weimar Triangle: diversified attack
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Radar: narrative distribution
Country Narrative Profiles
Each country has a distinct propaganda profile. Baltic states face a monotonal military threat; Weimar Triangle countries are attacked through individual vulnerabilities.
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🇵🇱 Poland
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🇱🇹 Lithuania
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🇱🇻 Latvia
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🇪🇪 Estonia
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🇩🇪 Germany
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🇫🇷 France
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📺🖼️ YouTube: Multimodal Analysis by Target Country
Transcript analysis (codebook v3.0) combined with thumbnail visual analysis (Vision LLM, codebook v2.0) reveals how the same propaganda system uses different visual packaging for different target countries.
Cluster comparison
| Cluster | Videos | Clickbait | Propaganda | FIMI % |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 🔵 Baltic States | 299 | 3.1 | 6.85 | 91.3% |
| 🔶 Weimar Triangle | 539 | 3.09 | 6.57 | 82.0% |
| Country | Videos | Clickbait | Propaganda | FIMI % | Top visual technique |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 🔶 🇵🇱 Poland | 221 | 3.05 | 6.72 | 85.5% | appeal_to_fear |
| 🔵 🇱🇹 Lithuania | 148 | 3.08 | 6.89 | 90.5% | appeal_to_fear |
| 🔵 🇱🇻 Latvia | 93 | 2.98 | 6.73 | 90.3% | appeal_to_fear |
| 🔵 🇪🇪 Estonia | 58 | 3.33 | 6.95 | 94.8% | appeal_to_fear |
| 🔶 🇩🇪 Germany | 169 | 3.14 | 6.54 | 79.9% | appeal_to_fear |
| 🔶 🇫🇷 France | 149 | 3.09 | 6.38 | 79.2% | appeal_to_fear |
High-propaganda thumbnails: what the audience sees first
Real YouTube thumbnails from videos scored 8–9/10 on propaganda scale. These images are the first contact point with the audience — designed to trigger emotional response before the content is even consumed.
Claims for Fact-Checking
AI analysis extracted verifiable claims from high-risk materials. Claims are shown in the original Russian language as published by state media. Click ↗ to view the original material.
Verifiable claims requiring fact-check
Coordination
| Source | Citations |
|---|---|
| цитирование тасс | 131 |
| цитирование риа новости | 37 |
| ссылка на тасс | 33 |
| цитирование белта | 18 |
| ссылка на риа новости | 16 |
| цитирование тасс как источника | 15 |
Conclusions
1. Two distinct propaganda strategies confirmed. The Baltic states face a monotonal military threat narrative (43–47%). The Weimar Triangle countries receive a diversified attack — each country targeted through its unique perceived vulnerability.
2. France: a new and distinctive target. Its propaganda profile is unique: internal problems (31%) lead over military buildup (26%). The nuclear threat narrative (15%) is essentially exclusive to France.
3. YouTube as the primary propaganda amplifier. Baltic-targeted videos carry higher FIMI concentration (91.3%) than Weimar-targeted content (82.0%). Estonia stands out with 94.8% FIMI.
4. TASS as the coordination backbone. TASS cited in 198 materials — primary amplification pipeline from Russian state media. — confirms that Belarusian state media functions as an amplification layer for Kremlin messaging.
5. Factual manipulation dominates. 1151 — makes propaganda harder to detect than outright fabrication.
Methodology
Materials were collected from three Belarusian state-controlled media sources: BelTA, SB.BY, and state-linked YouTube channels across six target countries: Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Germany, and France. AI deep analysis used GPT-5-mini with structured output. Multimodal YouTube analysis combines transcript codebook v3.0 with thumbnail Vision LLM codebook v2.0. Average AI confidence: 84.3%.
