|
6,960
Total materials
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1,040
AI deep-analyzed
|
634
Propaganda identified
|
265
High risk
|
6
Countries monitored
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• Top target by volume: 🇫🇷 France — 3,879 materials. Followed by: 🇩🇪 Germany (2,354), 🇵🇱 Poland (2,128).
• Top narrative: Military buildup — 134 materials in deep analysis (21% of identified propaganda).
• Multimodal FIMI on YouTube: Baltic cluster 96.9%, Weimar Triangle 94.6%. Highest country: 🇱🇻 Latvia (100.0% on 10 videos).
• AI: 1,040 materials processed, 265 flagged as HIGH risk (25.5%). 634 identified as propaganda (excluding neutral and not-about-targets).
• Coordination: TASS cited in 133 materials — primary amplification pipeline from Russian state media. 55 coordination events detected across 31 days.
Mentions by Country
🇫🇷 France leads with 3,879 materials.
| 🔶 🇵🇱 Poland | 2,128 | |
| 🔵 🇱🇹 Lithuania | 1,061 | |
| 🔵 🇱🇻 Latvia | 896 | |
| 🔵 🇪🇪 Estonia | 705 | |
| 🔶 🇩🇪 Germany | 2,354 | |
| 🔶 🇫🇷 France | 3,879 |
Propaganda Narratives
| Country | Propaganda materials | Dominant narrative | Distinctive feature |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🔶 🇵🇱 Poland | 279 | Border tensions (26%) | FIMI 91.7% |
| 🔵 🇱🇹 Lithuania | 232 | Border tensions (33%) | FIMI 92.9%, Border tensions 33% |
| 🔵 🇱🇻 Latvia | 120 | Military buildup (29%) | FIMI 100.0%, propaganda 8.2/10 |
| 🔵 🇪🇪 Estonia | 48 | Military buildup (29%) | FIMI 100.0%, propaganda 8.38/10 |
| 🔶 🇩🇪 Germany | 174 | Economic decline (24%) | FIMI 100.0%, propaganda 8.24/10 |
| 🔶 🇫🇷 France | 139 | Internal problems (22%) | FIMI 93.3% |
The Weimar Triangle countries (Poland, Germany, France) receive fundamentally different propaganda treatment than the Baltic states. While the Baltics face a monotonal military threat narrative (43–47%), each Weimar country is attacked through its unique perceived vulnerability.
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🔵 Baltic States: military monotone
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🔶 Weimar Triangle: diversified attack
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Radar: narrative distribution
Country Narrative Profiles
Each country has a distinct propaganda profile. Baltic states face a monotonal military threat; Weimar Triangle countries are attacked through individual vulnerabilities.
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🇵🇱 Poland
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🇱🇹 Lithuania
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🇱🇻 Latvia
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🇪🇪 Estonia
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🇩🇪 Germany
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🇫🇷 France
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Transcript analysis (codebook v3.0) combined with thumbnail visual analysis (Vision LLM, codebook v2.0) reveals how the same propaganda system uses different visual packaging for different target countries.
Cluster comparison
| Cluster | Videos | Clickbait | Propaganda | FIMI % |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 🔵 Baltic States | 32 | 3.34 | 8.1 | 96.9% |
| 🔶 Weimar Triangle | 56 | 3.39 | 8.02 | 94.6% |
| Country | Videos | Clickbait | Propaganda | FIMI % | Top visual technique |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 🔶 🇵🇱 Poland | 24 | 3.04 | 7.92 | 91.7% | appeal_to_fear |
| 🔵 🇱🇹 Lithuania | 14 | 3.21 | 7.86 | 92.9% | appeal_to_fear |
| 🔵 🇱🇻 Latvia | 10 | 3.3 | 8.2 | 100.0% | appeal_to_fear |
| 🔵 🇪🇪 Estonia | 8 | 3.62 | 8.38 | 100.0% | appeal_to_authority |
| 🔶 🇩🇪 Germany | 17 | 3.71 | 8.24 | 100.0% | appeal_to_fear |
| 🔶 🇫🇷 France | 15 | 3.6 | 7.93 | 93.3% | appeal_to_fear |
High-propaganda thumbnails: what the audience sees first
Real YouTube thumbnails from videos scored 8–9/10 on propaganda scale. These images are the first contact point with the audience — designed to trigger emotional response before the content is even consumed.
Claims for Fact-Checking
AI analysis extracted verifiable claims from high-risk materials. Claims are shown in the original Russian language as published by state media. Click ↗ to view the original material.
Verifiable claims requiring fact-check
Coordination
| Source | Citations |
|---|---|
| цитирование тасс | 84 |
| ссылка на тасс как источник | 20 |
| ссылка на тасс | 19 |
| ссылка на белта | 13 |
| цитирование белта | 12 |
| ссылка на белта как источник | 11 |
1. Two cluster strategies persist. In March 2026 the Baltic cluster (LT, LV, EE) accumulated 2,662 mentions, while the Weimar Triangle (PL, DE, FR) reached 8,361 mentions. Multimodal YouTube analysis shows Baltic FIMI at 96.9% and Weimar at 94.6% — both clusters operate as fully-formed propaganda targets, with Baltic slightly more intense.
2. 🇫🇷 France: top target by volume. With 3,879 materials, this country dominates the monitoring period. The dominant narrative is 22% Internal problems.
3. YouTube as propaganda amplifier. Multimodal analysis covered 88 videos across the 6 target countries. The highest FIMI concentration is on 🇱🇻 Latvia (100.0%)— almost every video mentioning this country contains foreign information manipulation indicators.
4. TASS as the coordination backbone. TASS cited in 133 of analyzed materials, followed by RIA Novosti (8). This confirms that Belarusian state media functions as an amplification layer for Kremlin messaging, not as an independent editorial operation.
5. Factual manipulation dominates. Of all detected manipulation types, factual manipulation (cherry-picking real data to distort conclusions) accounts for 1163 cases — more than emotional (649) and logical (498) combined. This makes the propaganda harder to detect than outright fabrication.
Methodology
Materials were collected from three Belarusian state-controlled media sources: BelTA, SB.BY, and state-linked YouTube channels across six target countries: Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Germany, and France. AI deep analysis used GPT-5-mini with structured output. Multimodal YouTube analysis combines transcript codebook v3.0 with thumbnail Vision LLM codebook v2.0. Average AI confidence: 83.1%.
