3,908 materials · 9 countries monitored · Baltic + Weimar Triangle + V4
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3,908
Total materials
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1,447
AI deep-analyzed
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1169
Propaganda identified
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543
High risk
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9
Countries monitored
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• Top target by volume: 🇫🇷 France: 1,393 materials. Followed by: 🇩🇪 Germany (1,231), 🇵🇱 Poland (917).
• Top narrative: Internal problems: 246 materials in deep analysis (21% of identified propaganda).
• Multimodal FIMI on YouTube: Baltic cluster 28.2%, Weimar Triangle 21.1%. Highest country: 🇱🇹 Lithuania (32.9% on 73 videos).
• AI: 1,447 materials processed, 543 flagged as HIGH risk (37.5%). 1169 identified as propaganda (excluding neutral and not-about-targets).
• Coordination: TASS cited in 137 materials — primary amplification pipeline from Russian state media. 71 coordination events detected across 30 days.
Mentions by Country
🇫🇷 France leads with 1,393 materials.
| 🔶 🇵🇱 Poland | 917 | |
| 🔵 🇱🇹 Lithuania | 572 | |
| 🔵 🇱🇻 Latvia | 608 | |
| 🔵 🇪🇪 Estonia | 315 | |
| 🔶 🇩🇪 Germany | 1,231 | |
| 🔶 🇫🇷 France | 1,393 | |
| 🟢 🇨🇿 Czech Republic | 196 | |
| 🟢 🇭🇺 Hungary | 197 | |
| 🟢 🇸🇰 Slovakia | 72 |
Propaganda Narratives
| Country | Propaganda materials | Dominant narrative | Distinctive feature |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🔶 🇵🇱 Poland | 373 | Military buildup (25%) | 144 videos |
| 🔵 🇱🇹 Lithuania | 253 | Military buildup (38%) | Military buildup 38% |
| 🔵 🇱🇻 Latvia | 180 | Military buildup (41%) | Military buildup 41% |
| 🔵 🇪🇪 Estonia | 74 | Military buildup (39%) | Military buildup 39% |
| 🔶 🇩🇪 Germany | 283 | Military buildup (25%) | 174 videos |
| 🔶 🇫🇷 France | 186 | Internal problems (26%) | 188 videos |
| 🟢 🇨🇿 Czech Republic | 19 | Military buildup (23%) | 37 videos |
| 🟢 🇭🇺 Hungary | 60 | EU internal division (30%) | EU internal division 30% |
| 🟢 🇸🇰 Slovakia | 27 | Arms to Ukraine (31%) | propaganda 8.26/10, Arms to Ukraine 31% |
The Weimar Triangle countries (Poland, Germany, France) receive fundamentally different propaganda treatment than the Baltic states. While the Baltics face a monotonal military threat narrative (43–47%), each Weimar country is attacked through its unique perceived vulnerability.
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🔵 Baltic States: military monotone
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🔶 Weimar Triangle: diversified attack
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The Visegrád Four (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia) are framed through a third lens. Here the dominant narrative is EU internal division: Hungary and Slovakia are cast as the “voice of reason” against Brussels. Poland appears in both Weimar and V4 clusters as an analytical lens, not double-counted in totals.
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🟢 V4: EU-division dominant
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🇵🇱 Poland: two contexts
In the Weimar context Poland is attacked as a Western military partner; in the V4 context it appears among Central European neighbours where the EU-division frame dominates. One dataset, two strategic constructions. |
Hungary remains analytically significant at moderate volume: 197 materials in June against 218 in May and the April peak. The trend recorded in the May issue is confirmed: after Viktor Orbán lost the April election to Péter Magyar’s Tisza party, the personalised campaign was retired. On June thumbnails the named figures are entirely absent (Orbán 0, Magyar 0), while the remaining coverage is folded into the generic anti-EU frame and still runs hot (propaganda 6.37/10 on a small base). This is not a ‘puppet confirmed’ campaign but demobilisation: once the symbolic battle was lost, the storyline was closed.
| 30% | |
| 17% | |
| 16% | |
| 14% | |
| 9% | |
| 4% |
Country Narrative Profiles
Each country has a distinct propaganda profile. Baltic states face a monotonal military threat; Weimar Triangle countries are attacked through individual vulnerabilities.
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🇵🇱 Poland
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🇱🇹 Lithuania
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🇱🇻 Latvia
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🇪🇪 Estonia
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🇩🇪 Germany
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🇫🇷 France
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🇨🇿 Czech Republic
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🇭🇺 Hungary
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🇸🇰 Slovakia
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Transcript analysis (codebook v3.0) combined with thumbnail visual analysis (Vision LLM, codebook v2.0) reveals how the same propaganda system uses different visual packaging for different target countries.
Cluster comparison
| Cluster | Videos | Clickbait | Propaganda | FIMI %* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 🔵 Baltic States | 213 | 3.18 | 5.98 | 28.2% |
| 🔶 Weimar Triangle | 506 | 3.11 | 5.8 | 21.1% |
| 🟢 V4 | 225 | 3.21 | 5.84 | 22.7% |
| Country | Videos | Clickbait | Propaganda | FIMI %* | Top visual technique |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 🔶 🇵🇱 Poland | 144 | 3.24 | 5.54 | 23.6% | appeal_to_fear |
| 🔵 🇱🇹 Lithuania | 73 | 3.36 | 7.07 | 32.9% | appeal_to_fear |
| 🔵 🇱🇻 Latvia | 94 | 3.13 | 5.59 | 28.7% | appeal_to_fear |
| 🔵 🇪🇪 Estonia | 46 | 2.98 | 5.07 | 19.6% | appeal_to_fear |
| 🔶 🇩🇪 Germany | 174 | 3.0 | 6.07 | 18.4% | appeal_to_authority |
| 🔶 🇫🇷 France | 188 | 3.12 | 5.76 | 21.8% | appeal_to_authority |
| 🟢 🇨🇿 Czech Republic | 37 | 3.14 | 5.84 | 21.6% | appeal_to_authority |
| 🟢 🇭🇺 Hungary | 33 | 3.03 | 6.37 | 18.2% | appeal_to_fear |
| 🟢 🇸🇰 Slovakia | 11 | 3.55 | 8.26 | 27.3% | appeal_to_fear |
* FIMI indicator restored under the updated methodology (visual codebook v2.1, EEAS operationalization). June 2026 is a calibration month: values are an upper-bound estimate; criteria will be refined in subsequent issues.
🧭 DISARM: Tactics & Techniques (indicative)
Starting with this issue, narrative categories and manipulation types identified by the AI analysis are translated into techniques of the open DISARM Red framework — the shared vocabulary of EEAS, FIMI-ISAC and the counter-disinformation community. Counts are materials carrying indicators of a technique; one material can map to several. Deterministic v0 translation layer, not per-item behavioural coding.
| ID | Technique | Materials |
|---|---|---|
| T0023 | Distort Facts | 438 |
| T0078 | Dismay | 381 |
| T0135 | Undermine | 359 |
| T0075.001 | Discredit Credible Sources | 246 |
| T0079 | Divide | 202 |
Coordination layer: T0002 — 165, T0084 — 165, T0119 — 59.
High-propaganda thumbnails: what the audience sees first
Real YouTube thumbnails from videos scored 8–9/10 on propaganda scale. These images are the first contact point with the audience — designed to trigger emotional response before the content is even consumed.
Cross-modal divergence: thumbnail vs content
A distinct May finding: for a share of videos the thumbnail is alarmist while the transcript’s assessed threat is low. The cover does emotional work the content does not. Divergence is highest for 🇱🇻 Latvia (25.5%).
| Country | Divergence | Alarmist cover / low-threat text |
|---|---|---|
| 🔵 🇱🇻 Latvia | 25.5% | 24/94 |
| 🔶 🇵🇱 Poland | 24.3% | 35/144 |
| 🔵 🇪🇪 Estonia | 21.7% | 10/46 |
| 🔶 🇫🇷 France | 20.7% | 39/188 |
| 🔶 🇩🇪 Germany | 18.4% | 32/174 |
| 🔵 🇱🇹 Lithuania | 16.4% | 12/73 |
| 🟢 🇨🇿 Czech Republic | 13.5% | 5/37 |
| 🟢 🇭🇺 Hungary | 12.1% | 4/33 |
| 🟢 🇸🇰 Slovakia | 9.1% | 1/11 |
Claims for Fact-Checking
AI analysis extracted verifiable claims from high-risk materials. Claims are shown in the original Russian language as published by state media. Click ↗ to view the original material.
Verifiable claims requiring fact-check
Coordination
| Source | Citations |
|---|---|
| цитирование тасс | 93 |
| цитирование тасс как источника | 22 |
| ссылка на тасс | 12 |
| цитирование риа новости | 11 |
| цитирование белта | 11 |
| ссылка на тасс как источник | 10 |
1. Two cluster strategies persist. In June 2026 the Baltic cluster (LT, LV, EE) accumulated 1,495 mentions, while the Weimar Triangle (PL, DE, FR) reached 3,541 mentions. Multimodal YouTube analysis shows Baltic FIMI at 28.2% and Weimar at 21.1% — both clusters operate as fully-formed propaganda targets, with Baltic slightly more intense.
2. 🇫🇷 France: top target by volume. With 1,393 materials, this country dominates the monitoring period. The dominant narrative is 26% Internal problems.
3. YouTube as propaganda amplifier. Multimodal analysis covered 800 video–country pairs across the target countries. The leader by share of FIMI-flagged thumbnails: 🇱🇹 Lithuania (32.9%) (calibration-month upper-bound estimate).
4. TASS as the coordination backbone. TASS cited in 137 of analyzed materials, followed by RIA Novosti (11). This confirms that Belarusian state media functions as an amplification layer for Kremlin messaging, not as an independent editorial operation.
5. Factual manipulation dominates. Of all detected manipulation types, factual manipulation (cherry-picking real data to distort conclusions) accounts for 1774 cases — more than emotional (1085) and logical (928) combined. This makes the propaganda harder to detect than outright fabrication.
Methodology
Materials were collected from three Belarusian state-controlled media sources: BelTA, SB.BY, and state-linked YouTube channels across six target countries: Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Germany, and France. AI deep analysis used GPT-5-mini with structured output. Multimodal YouTube analysis combines transcript codebook v3.0 with thumbnail Vision LLM codebook v2.0. Average AI confidence: 81.9%.
