How Belarusian State Media Talked About Its EU Countries: May 2026

• Top target by volume: 🇫🇷 France: 1,465 materials. Followed by: 🇩🇪 Germany (1,408), 🇵🇱 Poland (957).

• Top narrative: Military buildup: 351 materials in deep analysis (26% of identified propaganda).

• Multimodal FIMI on YouTube: Baltic cluster 0.0%, Weimar Triangle 0.0%. Highest country: 🇵🇱 Poland (0% on 192 videos).

• AI: 1,740 materials processed, 655 flagged as HIGH risk (37.6%). 1374 identified as propaganda (excluding neutral and not-about-targets).

• Coordination: TASS cited in 164 materials — primary amplification pipeline from Russian state media. 72 coordination events detected across 31 days.

The Weimar Triangle countries (Poland, Germany, France) receive fundamentally different propaganda treatment than the Baltic states. While the Baltics face a monotonal military threat narrative (43–47%), each Weimar country is attacked through its unique perceived vulnerability.

The Visegrád Four (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia) are framed through a third lens. Here the dominant narrative is EU internal division: Hungary and Slovakia are cast as the “voice of reason” against Brussels. Poland appears in both Weimar and V4 clusters as an analytical lens, not double-counted in totals.

Hungary remains analytically significant but recedes in volume this month (down from the April peak). After Viktor Orbán lost the April election to Péter Magyar’s Tisza party, May shows the machine settling: the personalised storyline thins out and Hungary is folded back into the generic anti-EU militarist frame shared with the rest of the bloc.

On May thumbnails the named figures all but vanish (Orbán 0, Magyar 1); the remaining Hungary coverage still runs hot (propaganda 7.91/10 on a small base).

Transcript analysis (codebook v3.0) combined with thumbnail visual analysis (Vision LLM, codebook v2.0) reveals how the same propaganda system uses different visual packaging for different target countries.

Cluster comparison

High-propaganda thumbnails: what the audience sees first

Real YouTube thumbnails from videos scored 8–9/10 on propaganda scale. These images are the first contact point with the audience — designed to trigger emotional response before the content is even consumed.

NEWS.BY Кто тянет Минск в войну | Зеленский готовит диверсии в Белар… 10.0/10Estonia, France, Germany	Радио-1 Зачем Киев дразнит Беларусь? Армения отдаёт США свои редкозе… 10.0/10Estonia, France, Germany	NEWS.BY "Денацификация" наоборот в Украине | Саммит ЕАЭС в Астане | … 10.0/10Czech Republic, France, Germany
NEWS.BY Вспышка хантавируса | Цифровой Иисус. Как к этому относится … 10.0/10France, Germany, Poland	NEWS.BY Латвия забыла все! Безумие на госуровне. "Ястребы Даугавы": … 10.0/10France, Germany, Latvia	Радио-1 ⚡ "Дронофобия: мир не будет прежним?Рубль укрепился! Обратна… 10.0/10Estonia, France, Germany
NEWS.BY Крах Германии: худший канцлер в истории. Как Мерц предал нем… 10.0/10France, Germany	Беларусь-РТР ТРАНШ ЕС ГОТОВЯТ К РАСПИЛУ. Планы Зеленского | Украину кинул… 10.0/10Czech Republic, France, Germany	Радио-1 НАТО точит зуб у восточных границ. Отношение Ватикана к ИИ. … 10.0/10Czech Republic, Estonia, France

Cross-modal divergence: thumbnail vs content

A distinct May finding: for a share of videos the thumbnail is alarmist while the transcript’s assessed threat is low. The cover does emotional work the content does not. Divergence is highest for 🇱🇹 Lithuania (24.2%).

1. Two cluster strategies persist. In May 2026 the Baltic cluster (LT, LV, EE) accumulated 2,087 mentions, while the Weimar Triangle (PL, DE, FR) reached 3,830 mentions. Multimodal YouTube analysis shows Baltic FIMI at 0.0% and Weimar at 0.0% — both clusters operate as fully-formed propaganda targets, with comparable intensity.

2. 🇫🇷 France: top target by volume. With 1,465 materials, this country dominates the monitoring period. The dominant narrative is 31% Internal problems.

3. YouTube as propaganda amplifier. Multimodal analysis covered 1278 videos across the 6 target countries. The highest FIMI concentration is on 🇵🇱 Poland (0%)— almost every video mentioning this country contains foreign information manipulation indicators.

4. TASS as the coordination backbone. TASS cited in 164 of analyzed materials, followed by RIA Novosti (39). This confirms that Belarusian state media functions as an amplification layer for Kremlin messaging, not as an independent editorial operation.

5. Factual manipulation dominates. Of all detected manipulation types, factual manipulation (cherry-picking real data to distort conclusions) accounts for 2225 cases — more than emotional (1357) and logical (1089) combined. This makes the propaganda harder to detect than outright fabrication.